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SAVVY SHAW-PING: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO AIA 
ESTOPPEL 
STEVEN J. SCHWARZ, TAMATANE J. AGA, KRISTIN M. ADAMS & 
KATHERINE C. DEARING* 
INTRODUCTION** 
The America Invents Act (AIA) was signed into law in 2011 and made 
sweeping changes to the U.S. patent laws, including the introduction of two 
new permanent proceedings to determine patentability of claims in granted 
patents: Inter Partes Review (IPR) and Post Grant Review (PGR).1 IPR and 
PGR, referred to collectively herein as “AIA Trials,” were created “to estab-
lish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent 
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs” and “to 
create a timely, cost-effective alternative to litigation.”2 These proceedings 
occur before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and are adversarial 
in nature between the patent owner and a party petitioning for review of the 
patent claims.3 But AIA Trials are not without potential trade-offs for peti-
tioners: they risk estoppel of certain invalidity grounds in subsequent pro-
ceedings. 
 
Steven Schwarz is a partner at Venable LLP in the Patent Prosecution and Counseling Group and Co-
Chair of Venable’s Post-Grant Practice Group. Tamatane Aga, Kristin Adams, and Katherine Dearing are 
associates at Venable in the Intellectual Property Division.  
**The following analysis was drafted prior to the Supreme Court’s April 24, 2018, decision in SAS Insti-
tute Inc. v. Iancu, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, No. 16-969, 584 U.S. __ (2018). 
The Court held that “there is no room in this scheme [of inter partes review] for a wholly unmentioned 
‘partial institution’ power that lets the Director select only some challenged claims for decisions.” Id. at 
*12. SAS clarifies that 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) does not contemplate partial institutions on a claim-by-claim 
basis. As of the writing of this article, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board has not issued guidance on 
whether it considers the holding of SAS to also prohibit partial institutions on a ground-by-ground basis, 
such as with the denied redundant grounds considered in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel 
Systems, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed Cir. 2016) and discussed below. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s 
interpretation of SAS will impact the litigation strategy for both petitioners and patent owners.  
 1.  See generally Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Pro-
ceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,679–80, 
48,687–93 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100–.108, .120–.123, .200–.208, .220–.224, 
.300, .302–.304). 
 2.  Id. at 48,680. 
 3.  See id. at 48,687–93. 
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This Article will begin by addressing the mechanics of estoppel within 
AIA Trials. It will next provide a review of case law demonstrating the ways 
that the Federal Circuit, district courts, and the PTAB have interpreted these 
provisions. The Article will conclude with recommendations for practition-
ers in applying the lessons learned from these tribunals regarding the appli-
cation of statutory estoppel under the AIA. 
I. MECHANICS OF ESTOPPEL 
AIA Trials proceed in two stages at the PTAB.4 In the first phase, the 
PTAB determines whether to institute the review.5 If instituted, a second 
phase occurs, referred to as a “trial,” in which the PTAB conducts the review 
proceeding and issues a final written decision.6 The final written decision 
invokes the estoppel provisions of the AIA.7 For the unsuccessful petitioner, 
this can severely limit the invalidity challenges available during subsequent 
proceedings in the district court or International Trade Commission. 
The estoppel provisions for AIA trials, referred to herein as “AIA Es-
toppel,” are provided by 35 U.S.C. §§ 315 and 325, for IPR and PGR, re-
spectively.8 AIA Estoppel applies against Petitioners in subsequent proceed-
ings in federal district courts, the PTAB, and the International Trade 
 
 4.  In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d, Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See id. at 1272, 1278, 1289. 
 7.  35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012). 
 8.  Section 315(e) provides: 
 
ESTOPPEL.— 
(1) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE.—The petitioner in an inter partes 
review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written deci-
sion under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, 
may not request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that 
claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised dur-
ing that inter partes review. 
(2) CIVIL ACTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS.—The petitioner in an inter 
partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written 
decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, 
may not assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 
of title 28 or in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission under 
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground that 
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review. 
35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2014). 
 
   Section 325(e) provides:  
 
ESTOPPEL.— 
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Commission.9 Generally, when an IPR or PGR results in a final written de-
cision, any petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is es-
topped from any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have 
raised during that review.10 The legislative history suggests that AIA Estop-
pel would help ensure that AIA trials would be a substitute for corresponding 
portions of the civil litigation, such as invalidity proceedings in federal dis-
trict courts and the International Trade Commission.11 
It is clear from the statutory provisions that AIA Estoppel attaches only 
when the IPR or PGR results in a final written decision issued by the PTAB.12 
Estoppel is analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis.13 Accordingly, when a final 
written decision does not address a particular patent claim, no AIA Estoppel 
attaches as to that claim.14 AIA Estoppel applies in the PTAB as well as the 
district courts and International Trade Commission.15 
II. APPLYING AIA ESTOPPEL 
A number of Federal Circuit decisions serve as guideposts for constru-
ing the application of AIA Estoppel. In Shaw Indus. Group, Inc. v. Auto-
mated Creel Sys., Inc., the Federal Circuit focused on the meaning of the 
 
(1) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE.—The petitioner in a post-grant re-
view of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision 
under section 328(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not 
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that claim on 
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that 
post-grant review. 
(2) CIVIL ACTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS.—The petitioner in a post-
grant review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written 
decision under section 328(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, 
may not assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 
of title 28 or in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission under 
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground that 
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that post-grant review. 
35 U.S.C. § 325(e) (2015). 
 9.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e). 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1368-80, at S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon 
Kyl) (“[E]xtending could-have-raised estoppel to privies will help ensure that if an inter partes review is 
instituted while litigation is pending, that review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-
printed-publications portion of the civil litigation.”). 
 12.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e). 
 13.  Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1052–53 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Emerson Elec. Co. v. IP Co., IPR2017-00252, Paper 7 at 6–9 (P.T.A.B. May 31, 2017). 
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phrase “raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes re-
view” found in 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).16 The court found that “IPR does not 
begin until it is instituted.”17 Accordingly, only those grounds that the Peti-
tioner raised or reasonably could have raised after the PTAB’s institution 
decision are subject to AIA Estoppel.18 In Shaw, the grounds of unpatenta-
bility at issue were denied institution by the PTAB because they were redun-
dant with other grounds of unpatentability on which review was instituted.19 
Accordingly, the court held, for the redundant grounds of unpatentability on 
which the PTAB declined to institute review, AIA Estoppel did not apply 
because the Petitioner could not have reasonably raised those grounds—
since they were denied institution by the PTAB—during that inter partes 
review.20 Another decision shortly afterward, HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., 
LLC, came to the same conclusion: grounds that were denied review and, 
therefore, could not have been raised during the IPR, are not estopped.21 
In Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., the Federal Circuit ap-
plied this same reasoning to the parallel provision in 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1), 
holding that AIA Estoppel does not apply in a subsequent AIA Trial pro-
ceeding to grounds of unpatentability upon which the Board declined to in-
stitute review in a previous PGR.22 This “declined to institute review” ex-
ception to AIA Estoppel has, however, not been uniformly applied by the 
district courts. 
Generally, in the cases where the district courts and the PTAB have 
analyzed the application of AIA Estoppel and its exceptions, the analysis has 
depended upon which of the following three types of prior AIA Trial deci-
sion is alleged to raise the estoppel: 
 
 16.  817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting § 315(e)) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 374 (2016). 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 1297–99. 
 20.  Id. at 1300. 
 21.  817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 22.  859 F.3d 1044, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because a final written decision does not determine the 
patentability of non-instituted claims, it follows that estoppel does not apply to those non-instituted claims 
in future proceedings before the PTO.”); see also id. at 1053 (citing Shaw Industries for the same propo-
sition in the IPR context). Note that Credit Acceptance involved the scope of estoppel from a covered 
business method (CBM) review upon a subsequent proceeding before the PTO, so the provisions of 
§ 325(e)(1), which are materially identical to the provisions of § 315(e)(1), applied. Had Credit Ac-
ceptance involved estoppel upon a subsequent court proceeding, Shaw would not have controlled its re-
sult, because the prior CBM was a “transitional” proceeding, available on a temporary basis, which raises 
more limited estoppel against court proceedings than the non-transitional proceedings like IPRs and post-
grant reviews. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) (2011) (non-transitional post-grant reviews), with Leahy-
Smith America Invests Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(A), (D), 125 Stat. 330 (transitional post-grant 
reviews).  
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(1) the prior art was used as a basis for grounds of unpatent-
ability and the PTAB issued a final written decision;23 
(2) the prior art was used as a basis for grounds of unpatent-
ability but the PTAB declined to institute trial;24 and 
(3) the prior art was not used as a basis for grounds of un-
patentability and the PTAB issued a final written deci-
sion based on other prior art.25 
 
We will discuss each of these categories with respect to district courts 
and then the PTAB. 
A. District Courts 
District courts have consistently held that a petitioner is estopped from 
pursuing grounds of unpatentability that were subject to a final written deci-
sion by the PTAB.26 For example, in Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diag-
nostics, Inc., the defendant essentially conceded estoppel over the ground 
which was subject to the final written decision by the PTAB, and the North-
ern District of California estopped the defendant from pursuing an invalidity 
defense based on this combination of prior art references.27 The application 
 
 23.  E.g., Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017); Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, LLC, IPR2015-00758, Paper 28 at *7–8 
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 894 (Fed Cir. 2018). 
 24.  E.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Prod. LLC, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556, 
at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017); Great West Cas. Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLC, IPR2016-01534, 
Paper 13 at 12 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
 25. E.g., Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 
(E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017); Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. INO Therapeutics, IPR 2016-00781, 2016 WL 
5105519, at *3 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2016).  
 26.  Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“There is 
no IPR estoppel with respect to a claim as to which no final written decision results”); see also Biscotti, 
2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (“Section 315(e) estops Microsoft from asserting at trial: (1) grounds for which 
the PTAB instituted IPR and determined those grounds to be insufficient to establish unpatentability after 
a trial on the merits”); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Prods. LLC, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 
1382556, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017) (“[Section 315(e)] provides that one who gets a final decision 
as to the validity of a patent claim in an IPR is estopped from asserting invalidity of that claim in another 
IPR or in district court on any ground that the person raised ore reasonably could have raised…”); Prince-
ton Dig. Image Corp. v. Konami Dig. Entm’t, Inc., No. 12-1461-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 1196642, at *2 (D. 
Del. Mar. 30, 2017); Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 
235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017). 
 27.  Verinata, 2017 WL 235048, at *4. 
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of AIA Estoppel in this scenario has been generally adopted by the district 
courts.28 
For grounds of unpatentability that were denied institution by the 
PTAB, district courts have disagreed in their application of Shaw. Some dis-
trict courts determine whether to apply AIA Estoppel by looking to the 
PTAB’s reasons for denying institution. In Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
the Eastern District of Texas narrowly interpreted Shaw, concluding that the 
exception to AIA Estoppel applies only when the PTAB declines to institute 
review for procedural reasons, such as redundancy.29 Accordingly, the Bis-
cotti court applied AIA Estoppel to bar revisiting of grounds that were con-
sidered on the merits, but ultimately found to be unmeritorious on the record 
before the PTAB.30 More specifically, the Biscotti court held AIA Estoppel 
to bar “grounds included in a petition but determined by the PTAB to not 
establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability (in other words, admin-
istrative review on the merits of a ground).”31 The court reasoned that, 
 
[s]uch an interpretation is consistent with due process—if 
the petitioner tries to raise a ground but is precluded from 
further pursuing that ground during subsequent IPR pro-
ceedings solely because of PTAB procedures, then the peti-
tioner should not be barred from asserting the merits of that 
same ground in a later PTAB or district court proceeding.32 
 
Other district courts have held that Shaw’s exception to AIA Estoppel 
applies to all grounds denied institution by the PTAB, regardless of the rea-
son for denial.33 For example, in Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Snap-On 
 
 28.  E.g., Biscotti, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (calling the application of estoppel to grounds subject 
to a decision “apparent”); Douglas Dynamics, 2017 WL 1382556, at *1 (“In other words, if you take the 
IPR alternative, you have to be satisfied with the PTAB answer; you cannot re-litigate the matter in district 
court”); Princeton, 2017 WL 1196642, at *2 (“Therefore because neither the Harmonix IPR nor the 
Konami/Harmonix IPR ever resulted in a final written decision as to claims 14, 19, or 20 . . . . Defendants 
are not estopped from asserting invalidity of those claims in their First Counterclaim.”); Verinata, 2017 
WL 235048, at *5 (applying estoppel to a claim upon which a final written decision was issued). 
 29. 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (“the Court reads Shaw and HP to exempt an IPR petitioner from § 
315(e)’s estoppel provision only if the PTAB precludes the petitioner from raising a ground during the 
IPR proceeding for purely procedural reasons, such as redundancy”).  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. at *6.  
 33.  Verinata, 2017 WL 235048, at *4 (“As Shaw dictates, the PTAB did not institute on this ground 
and, therefore, defendants are not estopped from raising the same invalidity argument in this litigation”); 
see also Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017) (“Thus, according to Shaw, (1) § 315(e) creates estoppel for grounds raised or 
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Inc., the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that “a petitioned ground for 
which IPR was not instituted, for whatever reason, does not give rise to IPR 
estoppel.”34 Similarly, in Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Products LLC, 
the Western District of Wisconsin explained that, “a defendant who presents 
its full invalidity case in a petition for IPR cannot be accused of holding back 
a secondary invalidity case to be used only if the IPR goes bad, so applying 
the Shaw approach to non-instituted grounds does not incentivize that unfair 
litigation strategy.”35 
Courts also have found that a later attempt to challenge claims based on 
a subset of a previously denied set of prior art references is subject to AIA 
Estoppel, in what is at least arguably a departure from Shaw. For example, 
in Verinata, the Northern District of California held that the defendant was 
estopped from raising a proposed prior art ground of invalidity even though 
that precise ground had been denied institution by the PTAB, because the art 
in that ground was a subset of the art raised in another proposed ground for 
which the PTAB granted institution.36 The court reasoned that “defendants 
raised, or could have raised, these grounds in the IPR proceedings, as the 
combination of [prior art] is simply a subset of the [combination of prior art 
in the] instituted grounds.”37 Similarly, in Biscotti, the Eastern District of 
Texas estopped the defendant from pursuing invalidity contentions based on 
prior art that was a subset of prior art in estopped grounds.38 
 
grounds that reasonably could have been raised during an IPR, (2) an IPR does not begin until institution, 
and (3) if the PTAB institutes IPR on some grounds but declines to institute on others, the IPR cannot 
reasonably raise the noninstituted grounds during the IPR, so the IPR estoppel provision does not apply 
based on its plain language”); Douglas Dynamics, 2017 WL 1382556 at *6 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017) 
(“Defendant is not estopped from asserting invalidity defenses included in its petition for inter partes 
review, but on which the Patent Trial and Appeals Board did not institute review”); Intellectual Ventures 
I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., No. 13-453-SLR, 2016 WL 7341713, at *13 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2016) (holding 
that because the PTAB rejected a certain invalidity ground, it could not be considered raised), reconsid-
eration denied, 2017 WL 107980 at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017); Illumina, Inc. v. Qiagen, N.V., No. 16-
2788-WHA, 2016 WL 4719269 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2016) (“The Federal Circuit recently held that statu-
tory estoppel does not apply to grounds raised in a petition but not instituted. […] Thus, the arguments 
that Qiagen raises herein, which were not instituted by the IPR, are not barred by Section 315(e)(2)”). 
 34.  Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., No. 14-CV-1296-JPS, 2017 WL 4220457, at *25 
(E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2017), appeal filed, (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018). 
 35.  Douglas Dynamics, 2017 WL 1382556, at *5. 
 36.  Verinata, 2017 WL 235048 at *4 (finding challenger was “estopped . . . from raising the obvi-
ousness combination of Dhallan and Binladen,” even though PTAB expressly denied institution on “Dhal-
lan and Binladen,” because PTAB granted institution on “Shoemaker, Dhallan and Binladen”).  
 37.  Id. In fact, however, in the prior IPR, the PTAB expressly limited the trial only to the particular 
grounds instituted. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Verinata Health, Inc., IPR2013-00276, Paper 11 at 22 
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2013) (“FURTHER ORDERED that the trial is limited to the grounds and claims 
identified above, and no other grounds are authorized as to these claims as they currently stand.”).  
 38.  Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *8 (E.D. 
Tex. May 11, 2017).  
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In contrast, in Oil-Dri, the Northern District of Illinois declined to apply 
estoppel to such grounds, reasoning, arguably consistent with Shaw, that de-
nied grounds which are a subset of previously instituted grounds should not 
be estopped, because they were not before the PTAB during the IPR, and 
“the PTAB explicitly considered in its final written decision whether a subset 
of the instituted grounds was properly before it, and determined that it was 
not.”39 Rather than limit the estoppel analysis to simply whether particular 
prior art references appeared in prior instituted grounds as the courts did in 
Verinata and Biscotti, the Oil-Dri court noted other potential differences in 
the bases of the two grounds of rejection, reasoning that “the obviousness 
inquiry based on the combination of two references is not necessarily the 
same as the obviousness inquiry based on a single reference.”40 
District courts have also disagreed on whether to apply AIA Estoppel 
to grounds that were not expressly raised in a prior petition. Some have re-
fused to do so. In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., the District 
of Delaware begrudgingly held Shaw’s AIA Estoppel exception to broadly 
include grounds that reasonably could have been raised but were not.41 Sim-
ilarly, in Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Wangs Alliance Corp., the District of 
Massachusetts found that Shaw compels the conclusion that AIA Estoppel 
does not apply to any grounds that the petitioner failed to raise in its petition 
for IPR.42 
In contrast, several district courts have applied AIA Estoppel to un-
raised grounds, reasoning that the grounds at issue reasonably could have 
been raised in a petition.43 In Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. 
Machines Corp., for example, the District of Delaware reasoned that allow-
ing a petitioner, “to raise arguments [in a subsequent court proceeding] that 
it elected not to raise during the IPR would give it a second bite at the apple 
 
 39.  Oil-Dri, 2017 WL 3278915, at *5. But see Biscotti, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7–8. 
 40.  Oil-Dri, 2017 WL 3278915 at *6. 
 41.  221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2016) (“Although extending the above logic to 
prior art references that were never presented to the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds 
the very purpose of this parallel administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a reasoned way around 
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw”). 
 42.  No. 1:14-CV-12298-DJC, at *8–9 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018). 
 43.  See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., No. 14-CV-1296-JPS, 2017 WL 
4220457, at *26 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (“the Court can preserve some measure of the policy goals 
animating the creation of IPR by holding that a petitioner is estopped from asserting invalidity contentions 
based on prior art that it could reasonably have included in its IPR petition but did not”); Oil-Dri, 2017 
WL 3278915 at *4 (explaining that Shaw creates estoppel for grounds that reasonably could been raised 
during an IPR); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Products LLC, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 
1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017) (noting grounds that reasonably could have been raised).  
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and allow it to reap the benefits of the IPR without the downside of mean-
ingful estoppel.”44 Similarly, in Network-1 Techs. Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent 
USA, Inc., the Eastern District of Texas applied AIA Estoppel to particular 
combinations of prior art, reasoning that although the petitioner, “did not 
assert the specific combinations of prior art references that it now seeks to 
assert at trial[,] . . . [petitioner] knew that [those references] existed, at least 
eight months before filing its IPR petition. Yet, [petitioner] chose not to raise 
the specific references before the PTAB.”45 The Network-1 court therefore 
concluded that estoppel should apply.46 Also, in Biscotti, the Eastern District 
of Texas interpreted the “reasonably could have raised” portion of the estop-
pel standard to find that grounds, or even particular prior art references, not 
included in a petition that a “skilled searcher conducting a diligent search 
reasonably could have been expected to discover” should be estopped.47 This 
“skilled searcher” standard has also been applied in the PTAB and in other 
district court cases.48 
B. Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
 The PTAB has applied estoppel in a broader and more consistent fash-
ion than the district courts generally. First, the PTAB mirrors the district 
courts in upholding estoppel for instituted grounds.49 However, unlike some 
district courts, the PTAB has generally not applied estoppel to denied 
grounds.50 In Great West Casualty Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, the 
Board interpreted Shaw to hold that estoppel does not apply “to any ground 
of unpatentability that was presented in a petition, but denied institution.”51 
In doing so, the Board “discern[ed] a substantive distinction between a 
ground that a petitioner attempted to raise, but was denied a trial, and a 
ground that a petitioner could have raised, but elected not to raise in its pre-
vious petition or petitions.”52 The Board has come to the same conclusion in 
 
 44.  No. 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912, at *12 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017). 
 45.  No. 6:11-CV-492-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 4478236, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *6–7 
(E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017). 
 48.  See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Wyeth LLC, IPR2015-00873, Paper 8, 2015 WL 5523393, at *4 
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2015) (applying the skilled searcher standard); Parallel Networks, 2017 WL 1045912, 
at *11–12 (applying the skilled searcher standard); Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12-CV-2533, 
2016 WL 4734389, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) (applying the skilled searcher standard). 
 49.  E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, IPR2015-00758, Paper 28 at *7–8 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2016), 
aff’d, 881 F.3d 894 (Fed Cir. 2018). 
 50.  See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 51.  IPR2016-01534, Paper 13 at 12 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
 52.  Id. at *13. 
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other cases, before and after Great West, regarding grounds that were not 
subject of a final written decision.53 
On the other hand, the PTAB generally takes a more expansive view 
than some district courts of what non-petitioned grounds may be estopped.54 
In several instances, the Board has estopped petitioners from maintaining 
grounds that were based on prior art of which petitioners were demonstrably 
aware but did not raise in prior proceedings.55 
If the combination of prior art could have been raised in a previous IPR, 
the Board has found such combinations estopped in a subsequent IPR, even 
though they included references in grounds actually raised and denied insti-
tution in the previous IPR. In Dell Inc. v. ETRI, a Board-designated “repre-
sentative decision” (meaning that it is of enhanced precedential value, 
though not binding on Board panels), the PTAB applied AIA Estoppel on a 
patent claim-by-patent claim basis in a second IPR to bar institution of re-
view of patent claims that had reached a final written decision in a previous 
IPR.56 The holding specifically applied to grounds proposed in that second 
IPR that included a prior art reference that had been raised in grounds denied 
review on the merits in the first IPR.57 
In another case, the Board considered prior art that was not raised in a 
previous IPR and found that the Petitioner had not demonstrated “that a 
skilled searcher conducting a diligent search would not have expected to dis-
cover [the prior art].”58 The Board was not persuaded by the evidence the 
Petitioner provided to show that a diligent search would not have yielded the 
 
 53.  See Emerson Elec. Co. v. IP Co., IPR2017-00252, Paper 7 at 9 (“We do not apply estoppel to 
claim 11 because, while it was challenged in the 1901 petition, it was not part of the final written decision 
in that matter because no grounds were instituted as to that claim”); see also Apotex, 2015 WL 5523393, 
at *5 (“Because the Board did not reach the merits of the challenge presented in Ground 1 when deciding 
whether to institute a trial in the ‘115 IPR, we determine that Petitioner is not estopped from asserting 
Ground 1 in this proceeding.”). 
 54.  See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See, e.g., Kofax, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, IPR2015-01207, Paper 22 at 8 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2016) 
(Petitioner was aware of prior art raised in earlier CBM but did not raise it), reh’g denied, Paper 24 
(P.T.A.B. July 20, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-2407 (Fed. Cir.); Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, IPR2014-
00884, Paper 38, 2015 WL 8536739, at 6 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015) (“Ford is estopped from maintaining 
its challenge against claims 21 and 23 in the instant proceeding because the asserted grounds are based 
on prior art that Ford was aware of, and could have raised, in prior proceedings challenging the same 
claims”), aff’d, 681 F. App’x 904 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential), petition for cert. filed (No. 17-229, 
Aug. 7, 2017); Apotex, 2015 WL 5523393, at *8 (“Petitioner was aware of, and cited, all of the Ground 
2 prior art in the ‘115 IPR Petition, and therefore reasonably could have raised it during that proceeding. 
Accordingly, Petitioner is estopped . . . .”). 
 56.  Dell Inc. v. ETRI, IPR2015-00549, Paper 10 at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2016) (representative 
decision). 
 57.  Id. at 4–6. 
 58.  Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. INO Therapeutics LLC, IPR2016-00781, Paper 10 at 10, (P.T.A.B. Aug. 
25, 2016).  
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two textbook references, noting, among other things, that the references were 
readily available by searching Google Books using keywords from the chal-
lenged patent specification.59 
The Board has, however, also conducted a reasonableness analysis be-
fore concluding that the ground or claim should be estopped under this 
“should have known” standard.60 In Johns Manville v. Knauf Insulation, the 
Board was not persuaded that an employee’s possession of relevant materials 
imputed knowledge of these documents to the petitioner.61 The Board rea-
soned: “Nowhere in its plain meaning and legislative history does section 
315(e)(1) expressly, or impliedly, consider the entire universe of institutional 
‘knowledge’ of a petitioner and its employees as being strictly estopped.”62 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
Patent owners and petitioners alike should consider impacts of AIA Es-
toppel as an important part of their overall litigation strategy. For example, 
patent owners filing infringement suits in district court may prefer to select 
a venue that strictly applies AIA Estoppel in order to limit the petitioner’s 
invalidity defenses to the fullest extent possible in district court should the 
claims be upheld during the AIA trial. Regardless of the venue, patent own-
ers may consider conditioning consent to stay litigation on agreement as to 
estoppel. 
For petitioners, a comprehensive and diligent prior art search should be 
performed before filing an IPR or PGR in the PTAB, in order to ensure that 
the optimum references are being asserted. In the absence of sufficient prior 
art searching before filing an IPR or PGR, key prior art references that are 
overlooked before the petition is filed may be subject to estoppel later in the 
district court, should the AIA trial be unsuccessful at invalidating the patent 
claims. Even with the best prior art, petitioners should carefully consider 
which references to present in the IPR or PGR petition, and how to present 
them, in order to minimize AIA Estoppel and preserve some invalidity de-
fenses for the district court or International Trade Commission. Without 
carefully considering these and other issues prior to filing an IPR or PGR, an 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See Johns Manville v. Knauf Insulation Inc., IPR2016-00130, Paper 35 at 9–12 (P.T.A.B. May 
8, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-2285 (Fed Cir.).  
 61.  Id. at 11.  
 62.  Id.; see also Great West Cas. Co. v. Intell. Ventures II LLC, IPR2016-01534, Paper 13 at 14–
16 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017) (finding, despite evidence that petitioner had failed to actually discover ref-
erence in searches conducted prior to first IPR, that reference nevertheless “was readily identifiable in a 
diligence search,” so grounds using it as “primary reference” in second IPR were estopped). 
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unsuccessful petitioner may find themselves back in the district court or In-
ternational Trade Commission with few or no remaining prior art defenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of AIA Trials brings with it new opportunities to stream-
line the patent system and to challenge improvidently granted patents. With 
those new opportunities, however, come new challenges in the form of une-
venly applied AIA Estoppel. The divergent approaches of the district courts 
and the PTAB in light of Shaw and HP present strategic challenges for patent 
owners and petitioners alike when formulating a litigation strategy. This Ar-
ticle attempts to provide some clarity as to best practices for petitioners and 
patent owners as they navigate AIA Estoppel through a review of the case 
law in the district courts and the PTAB. 
 
